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Justice Brennan stated in his dissent in Butler, "It is clear from our
opinion in Robersonthat we would have reached the identical conclusion had that case reached us in 1983 when Butler's conviction
became final." Id. It is clear that the decision in Robersonwas dictated
by Edwards, that Roberson did not establish a "new rule," and that
Butler should have been granted habeas relief. The Court's new
standard, however, apparently established that a result is not "dictated"
if one judge could erroneously but not unreasonably conclude otherwise.
Justice Brennan's dissent,joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun
and Stevens, characterized the majority holding as now requiring a
defendant seeking habeas relief to show "that the state court's rejection
of the constitutional challenge was so clearly invalid under thenprevailing legal standards that the decision could not be defended by
any reasonable jurist." Id. at 1219 (emphasis in original). Brennan

also pointed out that the majority's broad definition of what constitutes a "new rule," coupled with their narrow definition of what
constitutes prior precedent "limits [a] federal court's habeas corpus
function to reviewing state courts' legal analysis under the equivalent
of a 'clearly erroneous' standard of review." Id. at 1221-22.
The Butler opinion clearly effects Virginia defense counsel by
decreasing the effectiveness of appellate advocacy. Butler's only
possible benefit to the defense community is to foster an increased
sense of responsibility and professionalism on the part of trial judges
and attorneys because, as of now, an entire layer of appellate review
has been virtually eliminated.
Summary and analysis by:
Thomas J. Marlowe

SAFFLE v. PARKS
110 S. Ct. 1257,108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
Robyn Leroy Parks shot and killed Abdullah Ibrahim at an
Oklahoma City gas station where Ibrahim worked. The victim died of a
single chest wound. Parks told a friend that he shot Ibrahim because he
feared Ibrahim would tell the police that Parks purchased gasoline with
a stolen credit card.
The jury found Parks guilty of capital murder. During his penalty
trial, Parks offered evidence of his background and character in an effort
to show that his youth, race, school experience and broken home were
mitigating factors. The trial judge instructed the jury that it must
consider all mitigating circumstances proffered by Parks and that it
could consider any additional mitigating circumstances found from the
evidence. The judge specifically warned the jury, however, to avoid any
influence of sympathy, sentiment, passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary
factor when imposing sentence.
After deliberation, thejury found that Parks committed the murder
for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution
and sentenced him to death. Parks exhausted his direct appeal and state
collateral proceedings. He then sought federal habeas relief claiming,
inter alia, that the trial judge's antisympathy instruction violated the
eighth amendment because it effectively told the jury to disregard the
type of mitigating evidence Parks presented. Both the District Court and
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied relief. On rehearing,
the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that the antisympathy instruction
was unconstitutional for the reasons advanced by Parks. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.

HOLDING
The Supreme Court held that Parks was not entitled to federal
habeas relief because he was requesting the court to apply a "new rule"
of constitutional law. (See case summary of Butlerv. McKellar,Capital
Defense Digest, this issue, which discusses the stark realities of the
Supreme Court's "new rule" doctrineingreater detail.) InTeaguev.Lane,
109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989), the Court held that a new rule of constitutional
law will not be applied retroactively in cases on collateral review unless
the rule comes within one of two narrow exceptions. Id. at 1075. A new
rule was defined as a rule that "breaks new ground or imposes a new
obligation on the States or the Federal Government" or one that "was not
dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction

became fimal."Id. at 1070 (emphasis in original). The Court held that the
relief Parks sought would indeed constitute a new rule under Teague
because at the time the state court was considering Parks' claim, that
court was not compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the
antisympathy instructionviolated the eighth amendment. Saffle v. Parks,
110 S. Ct. 1257, 1260 (1990).
Additionally, the Court held that the new rule did not fall within
either of the two exceptions set forth in Teague. The first exception
allows the retroactive application of a new rule on collateral review if the
new rule "places 'certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct
beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe."'
Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1073 (quoting Mackey v. UnitedStates,401 U.S.
667, 692 (1971) (separate opinion of Harlan, J.)).
In Penry v,.
Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989), the Court examined
this exception in greater detail in response to Penry's claim that the
eighth amendment prohibited the execution of mentally retarded individuals. The Court stated, "[i]fwe were to hold thatthe eighth amendment
prohibits the execution of mentally retarded persons such as Penry, we
would be announcing a 'new rule."' Id. at 2952. The Court went on to
say, however, that such a new rule would meet the first Teagueexception
because, "a new rule placing a certain class of individuals beyond the
State's power to punish by-eath is analogous to a new rule placing
certain conduct beyond the State's power to punish at all." Id. Consequently, Penry expanded the first exception to include retroactive application of a new rule when the rule prohibits "a certain category of
punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense."
Id.
The Parks court found that a new rule which held that an
antisympathy instruction violated the eighth amendment would not fall
within the first exception as developedby Teague andPenry.Parks,110
S.Ct. at 1264. Further, after examining the second Teague exception,
(which is discussed in more detail in the case summary of Sawyer v.
Smith, Capital Defense Digest, this issue) the Court found that the
potential unconstitutionality of an antisympathy instruction did not fall
into the category of"'watershedrules ofcriminalprocedure' implicating
the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding." Id.

ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Years ago, the decisions in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)
and Eddingsv. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), established that a State
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may not bar the presentation, consideration or use of relevant mitigating
evidence at the penalty phase of a capital trial. More recently, in Penry,
the Court found that resolution of a claim that the Texas death penalty
scheme prevented the jury from considering and giving effect to certain
types of mitigating evidence, "was dictated byLockett andEddings,"and
that it therefore, did not involve the creation ofa new rule under Teague.
Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2947.
Despite the fact that the Teague framework severely limits the
scope of federal habeas review, the court's holding in Penry gave new
hope to the capital defense community that the Teague standards could
be met. Penry, required something "new" of a Texas system that had
been previously approved by the Court in Jurekv. Texas, 428 U.S. 262
(1976), and suggested that enforcement of the broad commands set out
in Lockett and Eddings would not constitute a new rule under Teague.
However, the Court's holdings in Parks, Butler and Sawyer have effectively destroyed most of the optimism generated by Penry.
In support of his contention that the antisympathy instruction
violated the eighth amendment, Parks argued that an antisympathy
instruction was barred byLockett andEddings"because jurors who react
sympathetically to mitigating evidence may interpret the instruction as
barring them from considering that evidence altogether." Parks,110 S.
Ct. at 1262. The Court disagreed with Parks' argument, stating that it
"misapprehends the distinction between allowing the jury to consider
mitigating evidence and guiding their consideration." Id.
In an effort to keep from deciding Parks' constitutional challenge,
the Court recharacterized his claim as one contesting the ability of a state
to dictate the mannerin which ajury may consider mitigating evidence.
This enabled the majority to find that Parks' requested relief would
constitute a new rule under Teague. The recharacterization of Parks'

claim seems to have made a distinction without a difference. There is no
significant difference between a jury instruction that directly limits the
jury from considering and giving effect to mitigation evidence and one
that achieves the same result in the course of telling the jury how it can
consider and give effect to that evidence. Both instructions will erect
barriers to a sentencer's understanding and ability to give effect to
mitigation evidence. Parks may also be a sign that the Court, by using its
"manner of consideration" rubric, intends to slowly dig away at established mitigation case law which, heretofore, has been a bulwark of
capital defense. Because this has not yet been explicitly done, however,
defense counsel should continue to insist that trials be conducted in a
manner that does not permit barriers of any kind to the presentation,
consideration, and use by the sentencer of any evidence proffered as a
basis for a sentence less than death.
In Parks,Butler and Sawyer, the Court has taken the position that
requested relief will constitute a "new rule" on collateral review unless
it is absolutely compelled by an earlier case and that no other court could
reasonably find otherwise. These decisions will bar federal review of
many claims which allege that trials were conducted in violation of the
U.S. Constitution. Consequently, it is even more important for trial
attorneys to insure that additional claims are not lost by waiver and
default. One way to do this is to learn all of the law, state and federal,
upon which a defendant is entitled to rely at trial. Substantial pretrial
time may be required to do this research. Constitutional claims based on
existing law, properly raised and preserved, are not affected by Teague
and its progeny.
Summary and analysis by:
Catherine M. Hobart

SAWYER v. SMITH
110 S. Ct. 2822, 111 L.Ed.2d 193 (1990)
United State Supreme Court
FACTS
Sawyer's conviction and death sentence became final in 1984
with the denial ofcertiorari by the United States Supreme Court. Sawyer
petitioned for federal habeas corpus review on the grounds that the
prosecutor's closing argument during the penalty phase of his trial
diminished the jury's sense of responsibility for the capital sentencing
decision in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi,472 U.S. 320 (1985).
Caldwell established the rule that the eighth amendment prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty by a sentencer who has been led to
believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness ofthe
capital sentence rests elsewhere.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana and the Court ofAppeals denied relief. Sawyer petitioned for
rehearing, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed. Justice Kennedy wrote
the 5-4 majority opinion.

HOLDING
The Court refused to address the petitioner's Caldwell claim,
holding that Caldwell relief was a "new rule" decided after Sawyer's
sentence became final, and therefore, unavailable to Sawyer. Under
Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989), a petitioner cannot receive the
retroactive benefit of a decision if such decision establishes a "new rule"
and does not fall within one of two exceptions. Teague defined a new rule

as a rule one that "breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the
States or the Federal Government," or that "was not dictated by precedent
existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final."Id. at 1070
(emphasis in original). The primary purpose of Teague is to ensure that
federal habeas corpus review of state convictions holds state courts to
compliance with the federal law in existence at the time a conviction
becomes final.
Sawyer argued that the Caldwell claim was based on the heightened eighth amendment due process requirements of capital cases, and
therefore, was dictated by Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982);
Lockettv. Ohio,438 U.S. 586 (1978); Gardnerv.Florida,430 U.S. 349
(1977); and Woodson v.North Carolina,428U.S. 280 (1976). The Court
rejected this argument on the grounds that the principles of heightened
reliability expressed in those cases were too generalized, and further, the
cases did not expressly deal with improper argument.
Sawyer also argued that the pre-Caldwell case, Donnelly v. De
Christoforo,416 U.S. 637 (1974), warned state courts about improper
argument. The Supreme Court refused to recognize this argument
because Donnelly dealt with improper argument in a non-capital fourteenth amendment"fundamental faimess" claim, and not theheightened
eighth amendment reliability basis of Caldwell.
Two narrow exceptions exist under Teague. "First, a new rule
should be applied retroactively if it places 'certain kinds of primary,
private individual conduct beyond the powerof the criminal law-making
authority to proscribe."' Teague v. Lane, 109 S Ct. 1060, 1073 (1989)
(quoting Mackey v. UnitedStates, 401 U.S. 667,675 (1971)(Harlan, J.
separate opinion)). Second, a new rule will be applied retroactively if it

